Baisarna ar nu sa desperata att de borjar skylla pa hog-frekvens-handel och manipulation. (Citat Ture Tratt i dag i kommentar pa Redeye). Mina fragor ar i dag: 1) Varfor gick olje-opriset forra aret upp till $145. Ingen har kunnat forklara det. 2) Varfor har borserna gatt upp sa mycket i sommar och inte minst de sista dagarna. 3) Varfor tjanar Golden Sachs enorma pengar sa snart efter den finansiella krisen Det finns bara en sak att skylla pa. Manipulation. Jag har i en blogg 25 juli skrivit av och citerat en hel artikel av journalisten Charles Duhigg i New York Times (24 juli 2009).

I slutet av denna artikel skall jag citera fore detta chefen for New York Borsen i amnet.

Jag forklarar an en gang att Goldman Sachs nu har tillgang till en super-dator som gor att de kan aga aktier i 0,03 sekunder.

Jag sag pa BBC i kvall hur landets skatteminister (ej finansminister) var orolig for de kortsiktiga agarna.

Han fragade om man skall behandla en aktieagare som som agt aktier i decenier i ett bolag pa lika satt som man behandlar en hedgefond som agare som kanske bara varit inne i tre veckor med lika stor aktiepost.

Nu kommer jag med de nya agarna. De som ager kanske tio procent i ett bolag i 0,03 sekunder.

Hur gar det till?

Datorn kanner av varenda order i en aktie. Datorn lagger en order. Saljare lagger sig over.

I ett navs har datorn kant vad nagra vill salja och datorn koper upp allt.

Sedan gar datorn och kanner efter vad order liggger for att kopa. I ett navs har datorn varit dar och salt pa fordelaktigaste priset. Ingen manniska har varit inblandad. Datorn kan inom 0,03 sekunder ha gjort affarer i samtliga aktier pa New York-borsen.

This is where all the money is getting made,” said William H. Donaldson, former chairman and chief executive of the New York Stock Exchange and today an adviser to a big hedge fund. “If an individual investor doesn’t have the means to keep up, they’re at a huge disadvantage.”

For most of Wall Street’s history, stock trading was fairly straightforward: buyers and sellers gathered on exchange floors and dickered until they struck a deal. Then, in 1998, the Securities and Exchange Commission authorized electronic exchanges to compete with marketplaces like the New York Stock Exchange. The intent was to open markets to anyone with a desktop computer and a fresh idea.

But as new marketplaces have emerged, PCs have been unable to compete with Wall Street’s computers. Powerful algorithms — “algos,” in industry parlance — execute millions of orders a second and scan dozens of public and private marketplaces simultaneously. They can spot trends before other investors can blink, changing orders and strategies within milliseconds.

High-frequency traders often confound other investors by issuing and then canceling orders almost simultaneously. Loopholes in market rules give high-speed investors an early glance at how others are trading. And their computers can essentially bully slower investors into giving up profits — and then disappear before anyone even knows they were there.

High-frequency traders also benefit from competition among the various exchanges, which pay small fees that are often collected by the biggest and most active traders — typically a quarter of a cent per share to whoever arrives first. Those small payments, spread over millions of shares, help high-speed investors profit simply by trading enormous numbers of shares, even if they buy or sell at a modest loss. (slut citat artikel i New York Times 24 juli 2009).